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Constitutional breakdowns in revolutionary outbreaks : the 
case of Egypt in February 2011 
 
 
As any social phenomenon the revolution can be understood materially or formally. 
Materially, the term refers to the purpose of change, whether in "the dominant values 
and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership or 
government activity and policies "1. Formally, the revolution indicates  the process 
through which the change occurs. Charles Tilly’s notion of revolutionary situation 
thus refers to a period during which the state is the object of competing claims by 
coalitions of actors each supported by a significant fraction of the population2. 
 
We will refer here to the formal understanding of revolution. It is a stipulative choice3, 
in the sense that we don’t value more the formal revolution than the material 
revolution as a scientific topic, but simply that it will be useful to our demonstration. 
 
The studied phenomenon will be a moment in the revolutionary situation, its 
beginning, what we call the revolutionary outbreak. This is the first episode, the one 
during which the old order collapses and where simultaneously the competition for 
the reformation of a new order begins. 
 
It is what sometimes history remembers as having been "the Revolution"; "The July 
Revolution",  the 3 days that led to the fall of Charles X;  "The February Revolution", 
the 8 days which preceded the abdication of Tsar Nicolas II ; or, "The Jasmine 
Revolution", the four weeks which resulted in the departure of Ben Ali. 
 
These revolutionary outbreaks will be viewed as political crisis periods, as understood 
by the French sociologist Michel Dobry. For actors, political crisis are characterized by 
structural uncertainty associated with a disruption of ordinary social functioning. 
Social conflictuality is no longer confined to relatively autonomous sectors but plays 
out on a global scale. This decompartmentalisation push actors to depart from their 
ordinary way to understand reality, and thus to redefine on a tenuous basis 
calculations they operate before acting4. 
 
This social disruption does not mean an absence of law as though thinks  Carré de 
Malberg5. Such an assumption equates the nature of law with the purpose of its 
producers, which  is only contingent. Put differently, law is above all a political tool 
                                                        
1 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 
264. 
2 Charles Tilly’s conception of revolution is in reality transcendental, in that it includes both its material 
and formal dimensions. The distinction is articulated around temporality, as the revolutionary situation 
ends or not with a "material" revolutionary outcome. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 
London, Longman Higher Education, 1979, c. 7. 
3 Troper Michel, « Les théories volontaristes du droit, ontologie et théorie de la science du droit », in 
Amselek Paul (dir.), Controverses autour de l’ontologie du droit, Paris, PUF, 1989, p. 55. 
4 DOBRY, Michel, Sociologie des crises politiques, 3ème ed. Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2009.  
5"During political upheavals resulting from a revolution or a coup, there is neither  legal principles nor 
constitutional rules: we are no longer in the domain of law, but in the domain of sheer force. “ CARRE ́ 
DE MALBERG, Raymond, Contribution a ̀la théorie générale de l’E ́tat, (t.2), Paris, Librairie de la Société du 
recueil Sirey, 1920, p. 496.  
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that may or may not produce effects. As a consequence, social disorder does not 
exclude the legal phenomenon. 
 
On the contrary, it may even attract it. This is due to external characters of  the legal 
discourse which turns it into an excellent instrument for return of order. As it is a 
prescriptive discourse, one can understand that actors can try to regulate a situation 
which get out of their control. Because this is a discourse referring ultimately to a 
transcendental will,  that of the people6, it can be used for incantatory purpose in order 
to settle the political crisis in favor of the speaker. The neutral form of the legal 
discourse7 can be used to calm the emotions which feed the revolutionary situation. As 
for its impersonal character8, it may minimize the risk of acting, as in case of mishaps 
actors can hide behind the imperative of obedience to law. 
 
But here we will focus on the internal properties of the legal discourse. Indeed, law 
constitutes a universe of meaning with its content, its rules and its own methods of 
reasoning, ie justification by empowerment and compatibility9. In that sense, the legal 
discourse carries an habitus10, or trivially said a culture,  that can allow institutional 
actors to reconstruct their sector. This recompartimentalisation effect of the legal 
discourse is all the more pronounced as it presents itself as autonomous and scholarly 
informed11. Legal statements can then be a medium of communication between 
institutional actors in times of political crisis, especially when the situation asks for 
emergency actions or renders physical meetings difficult. Legal discourse components 
allow the reconstruction of an intelligibility and accordingly enable actors to 
reformulate strategies possibly through anticipation of a cooperation with other 
institutional actors. 
 
It will be here illustrated by focusing on phenomena of breakdowns in constitutional 
legality, what Hans Kelsen calls “legal revolution”12 or Olivier Beaud “moment 
déconstituant”13. 
 
The notion of breakdown will be defined based on the premises of French legal 
realism, such as developed by Michel Troper. His theory is centered on  actors in that 
Troper considers the  legal system as a system of justification14. Moreover, it is realistic 
insofar as constitutional law is not confined to the written text of the Constitution but 
to all norms considered by actors as falling within the constitutional domain, such as 
                                                        
6KLEIN, Claude, Théorie et pratique du pouvoir constituant, Paris, PUF, Coll. Les voies du droit, 1996, 232 
p.  
7BOURDIEU, Pierre, « La force du droit : Eléments pour une sociologie du champ juridique », Actes de 
la recherche en sciences sociales, 1986, Vol. 64, p.5. 
8 Ibid. 
9"Modern positive law is a system both static and dynamic, since all decisions are always justified both 
by their compliance with the content of another statement and the authorization given to its author, that 
is to say in the name of truth and of an higher authority. " TROPER, Michel, Pour une théorie juridique de 
l’Etat, 1994, Paris, PUF, Coll. , p. 175. 
10 BOURDIEU, Pierre, Le sens pratique, 1980, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 480 p. 
11 BOURDIEU, Pierre, « La force du droit : Eléments pour une sociologie du champ juridique », op.cit, 
p.1. 
12"The revolution [...] is any change in the constitution or any change  or substitution of the constitution 
[...] that are not operated in accordance with the constitution in force." Kelsen, Hans, Pure Theory of 
Law, 1999 LGDJ, p.209. 
13 BEAUD, Olivier, La puissance de l’Etat, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, p.265.. 
14 See above. 
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customs and interpretations of constitutional texts by constitutional courts15. Thus, 
rupture in constitutional legality occurs, when an actor adopts a norm falling within 
the constitutional domain without justifying its production through reference to 
existing constitutional law. 
 
Considering an act of discontinuity as a legal act may seem paradoxical. But one must 
distinguish the legal character and legality, and an illegal act may also constitute an 
act with a legal character, in that it reveals a positioning of the actor towards the legal 
system. 
 
What message sends to other institutional actors the author of the constitutional 
breakdown ? Does it matter that the act explicitly attack the normative force of the 
Constitution to which are attributed all the norms of the constitutional system ? May 
the reaction of other institutional actors with respect to this breakdown may also be 
“meaningful” ? The relevance of these issues will be shown through a study of the 
Egyptian case and the outcome of the political crisis that was the "Revolution of 25 
January 2011". 
 
The “Revolution” was initiated by young activists who called for a demonstration on 
January 25, 2011. Following their success, most of opposition actors joined the 
movement, and Mubarak’s regime reacted first exclusively through repression. Then 
it engaged concurrently into a de-escalation strategy through institutional concessions: 
appointment of a vice-president, Mubarak's commitment to not run in the next 
presidential elections, formation a committee to review the constitution ... Both options 
failed to contain the uprising which even intensified through strikes widely followed 
throughout the country16. The army, which had until then adopted an impartial 
posture17, intervened directly on 11 February.  
 
It first adopted an act breaking with constitutional legality without directly attacking 
the 1971 Constitution (Part I). The military’s initiative was recognized few hours later 
by President Mubarak through his resignation (Part II). It is only two days after that 
the army explicitly put out of force the 1971 Constitution (Part III). 
 
I – The army’s constitutional break : the "Declaration" of February 11 
 
The act initially breaking the constitutional order was dated February 11, 2011 and 
issued by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF)18. The military adopted a norm 
in the domain of constitutional law, while  it had no competence to do so (Paragraph 
1), and without trying to justify itself legally (Paragraph 2). This decision seemed to be 
designed to optimize the military’s leeway in the management of subsequent events 
(Paragraph 3). 
 
A- SCAF’s absence of constitutional competence 
                                                        
15The term constitutional law here refers to what Michael Troper means by "constitutional system", ie 
the set of norms considered by Egyptian actors as materially constitutional. TROPER, Michel, La 
constitution comme système juridique autonome, Droits, 2002, vol. n° 35, n° 1, p. 65. 
16For a social history of the revolutionary outbreak EL-CHAZLI, Youssef, « On the Road to Revolution », 
trad. Jasper Cooper, Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. n°62, n°5, pp.843-865. 
17In reality the army had alternated between pledges to protesters and the regime. BISHARA, Dina et 
ALBRECHT, Holger, « Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt », 
Middle East Law and Governance, 2011, vol. 3, n° 1, pp. 13-23. 
18 Declaration n° 2 of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, 11 February 2011. 
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Through the Declaration of 11 February 2011, the SCAF modified the organization of 
public authorities  of 1971 constitutional system. It vested itself with the responsibility 
of "ensuring the implementation21" (daman tanfiz) of a series of measures: the end of the 
state of emergency22, legislative amendments, free and fair presidential elections, 
judicial decisions and their execution in the context of litigation over 2010 
parliamentary elections23 and a constitutional review. 
 
The Declaration of 11 February 2011 was breaking with existing constitutional law, 
which not only did not recognize SCAF’s power to change the organization of public 
authorities, but did not even recognized its existence, as the 1971 Constitution referred 
to another military body, the National Defense Council (Majlis al-difa‘ al-watani) 25. The 
SCAF existed in Egyptian law only through legislative reference. The text was dealing 
with the direction and the organization of armed forces, and stated that the SCAF was 
competent to "study all  important issues and make decisions about these domains26". 
This provision was not considered as including the modification of the functioning of 
public authorities even in exceptional situations27, and was regarded as relating 
exclusively to armed forces’ internal affairs, as mentioned in the presidential decree 
defining SCAF’s prerogatives28. 
 
Moreover, the SCAF had never interfered in politics, so no one could argue that it  
acted according to a custom. If the SCAF held no power to modify the organization of 
public authorities, it did not even try to justify this normative creation through 
reference to existing constitutional law. 
 
B - The absence of justification vis-à-vis constitutional law 
 
In addition of the fact that the Declaration of 11 February 2011 was not the 
implementation of a competence that the SCAF held under Egyptian constitutional 
law, another element was reflecting military’s willingness to break with the 
constitutional system of 1971 Constitution. The army did not even attempt to  justify 
its decision, whereas several statements of the constitutional system could have 
accomplished such a function. 
 
                                                        
21 Preamble of the Declaration n°2 of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, 11 February 2011 : "Given 
the evolution of current events upon which rely the fate of the country, and in the framework of  internal 
and external events, and the decision to delegate powers to the vice president of the Republic and the 
belief in our national responsibility to preserve its stability and security of, the Supreme Council decided 
... ".  
22 The state of emergency had been continuously in force since the beginning of the mandate of Hosni 
Mubarak in 1981. Unlike other countries state of emergency’s regime was set in the constitution (Article 
148 of 1971 Constitution). 
23Courts decisions had canceled the results of the 2010 parliamentary elections won by Mubarak’s party 
but these decisions had not been enforced.. 
25 The National Defense Council, mentioned in Article 182 of the Constitution of 1971, was composed of 
military personnel and civilians, including  the president of the Republic, and was competent to 
examine all issues concerning the safety of the country. 
26 Article 10 of Decree Law n° 4 of 1968 on the management and control of the army affairs. 
27 On this issue see AHMAD RAHGEB, « Men yuhasib al-Majlis al-‘askari”, Jadaliyya, 21 mai 2011.  
28 Decree n° 365 of 1989 on the powers of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 
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Firstly, the SCAF did not rely on the constitutional text. However, the article 18029 of 
1971 Constitution was identifying the people with the army and could have justified  
the SCAF’s decision, for example in the name of popular sovereignty mentioned in 
Article 73. The army’s choice to not rely on the constitutional text was all the more so 
noteworthy that the Declaration of 11 February 2011 was referring to the fulfillment of 
"the legitimate demands of the people" to justify the intervention of the military30. 
 
Secondly, the SCAF did not resort to the theory of exceptional circumstances, yet 
entrenched in Egyptian constitutional law through several provisions of the 
Constitution31. The military could have invoked it to argue that their breakout of 
constitutional legality was consistent with constitutional law, to the extent that the 
theory of exceptional circumstances enables to justify the implementation of 
“abnormal” legal regimes to situations deemed extraordinary32. Despite the fact that 
the Declaration contained language referring to exceptional circumstances, such as 
"current events upon which rely the fate of the country”, the military did not explain 
how such events justified the adoption of decisions violating constitutional law neither 
why it was legitimizing their exit of constitutional legality. 
 
SCAF’s refusal to connect with the Egyptian constitutional system seemed designed 
to maximize its leeway to manage the following events. 
 
C  - Optimizing the military’s leeway  
 
Here we will discuss why the SCAF, which rejected the constitutional system, did not 
go the whole way and did not explicitly announced the repeal or the suspension of the  
1971 Constitution.  
 
By refusing to connect its Declaration with constitutional legality, the army appeared 
as asserting its power towards  bodies of the 1971 Constitution. The SCAF announced 
its intent to deal with the difficult political situation created by the popular protest 
movement against Mubarak  regardless of their power. The army thus showed its 
sovereignty, giving a strategic dimension to Schmitt’s idea that the sovereign is the 
one who decides over the suspension of the constitution33.  Indeed courts and political 
bodies could have invoked the unconstitutionality of army’s takeover, but by acting 
without reference to constitutional law  the SCAF signaled preventively that it would 
consider such arguments as inadmissible. 
 
The non-explicit repealing of the constitution may also have been a precautionary 
decision. In the event that the military would have then be accused of "betraying" the 
constitution, they could have hide behind the absence of explicit attack on the 
normative force of the text in order to argue a posteriori the constitutionality of the 
Declaration, by citing for example the theory of exceptional circumstances mentioned 
                                                        
29 Article 180 of the 1971 Constitution: “ The State alone shall establish armed forces which owe their 
allegiance to the people. “ 
30 Article 2 of  the Declaration n° 2 of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, 11 February 2011: "The 
armed forces are committed to support the legitimate demands of the people and to implement them 
accurately and seriously in a defined time frame, until the peaceful transfer of power towards the free 
democratic society to which people aspire “. 
31 See below. 
32 D. Baranger, « L’état d’urgence dans la durée », Revue française de droit administratif,  2016, n°3,  p. 453. 
33 SCHMITT, Carl, Théologie politique, Paris, Gallimard, Coll. Bibliothèque des sciences humaines, 1988, 
p.67. 
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above. Moreover, by maintaining the 1971 Constitution, the army preserved its legal 
options to manage the ongoing political crisis, including the possibility of relying on 
the provisions of constitutional law associated with this document.  
 
In short, the army’s Declaration of February 11 characterized by the paradox of a clear 
desire to break with the constitutional legality while not attacking explicitly 1971 
Constitution, was designed to expand its legal leeway in an uncertain political 
situation. The strategy was to be free of the constraints of positive constitutional law, 
while preserving its ability to use afterwards this law  if necessary. The act of the 
military  and its strategy were recognized by President Mubarak in the announcement 
of his departure from power. 
 
II – The break’s recognition : Mubarak's resignation on February 11 
 
A few hours after the  SCAF declaration, vice president Omar Suleiman34 announced 
on television that President Hosni Mubarak had "decided to abandon (takhliya) his 
position and vested the SCAF with the authority to administer (idara) the country's 
affairs."  We interpret this decision as an acknowledgment of the setting aside of the 
1971 Constitution, as it manifested president’s will to not refer to existing 
constitutional law. Not only Hosni Mubarak violated constitutional provisions 
relating to the departure of the president (Paragraph 1), but he also transferred a 
power he had no power to vest (Paragraph 2), without even trying to justify himself 
in relation to "constitutional legality" (Paragraph 3). This act appeared designed to set 
the basis for a potential return in power ( Paragraph 4). 
 
A  - A departure from power outside the framework of constitutional law 
 
The 1971 Constitution contained a provision stating the procedure in case of voluntary 
departure of the president of the Republic. It appeared in Article 83: 
 
In case of resignation, the President shall address the letter of resignation to the People’s 
Assembly.  
 
Mubarak’s decision was not connected to this article, and in a striking manner. First, 
he  did not resigne (istiqala), but announced the abandonment of his office (takhliya)35. 
Then, he did not leave power in accordance with the aforementioned procedure, that 
is to say by sending a letter of resignation to the lower house, the People's Assembly 
(Majlis al-Sha'b). His departure did not even obey any formalities. That was not only 
the departure of Hosni Mubarak which was outside the constitutional framework, but 
also the transfer to the SCAF of the authority to "administer the country's affairs." 
 
B - A transfer of power to the SCAF outside the constitutional framework 
                                                        
34Hosni Mubarak appointed a vice-president for the first time of his mandate at the beginning of the 
revolutionary movement. He endowed, Omar Suleiman, then director of the intelligence services, with 
the mission to discuss with all political actors in order to agree on  legislative and constitutional reforms. 
Al-Yum Al Sabi', January 31, 2011. 
35Curiously this subtlety was not noted  by the legal literature on the 25 January Revolution. See for 
example MALLAT, Chibli, WAGENBERG, Maria Van, ABDELKARIM, Mostafa et SIMCOCK, Julian, 
« Revising Egypt’s Constitution : A Contribution to the Constitutional Amendment Debate », Harvard 
International Law Journal, 2011, n° 52, pp. 183-203 ;  BROWN, Nathan J, « Egypt’s Failed Transition », 
Journal of Democracy, 2013, vol.4, n° 24, pp. 45-58 ; RAYNAL, Pierre-Marie, « Révolution et légitimité : 
La dimension politique de l’excursion sociologique du droit constitutionnel », Juspoliticum, 2012, n° 7. 
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As for the second part of Mubarak’s decision, which conferred  the SCAF the authority 
to run the country's affairs, it also reflected the president’s willingness to set aside the 
constitutional framework.  
 
First, by vesting the military with such a power, Mubarak ignored the provisions 
governing the presidential interim, which were applicable in case of vacancy or 
temporary incapacity of the president. The first provision specified that the interim 
had to be exercised by the president of the People's Assembly until the organization of 
presidential elections within 60 days36, and the second that in case of temporary 
incapacity, the president must delegate his powers to the vice-president37. 
 
If we consider this decision as a creation of a prerogative for the SCAF, it must be 
stressed that the Egyptian constitutional law did not confer to the president the ability 
to unilaterally amend the 1971 Constitution38. Moreover if one considers this decision 
as a delegation of presidential powers, such a delegation was only recognized to the 
benefit of the vice-president39 and was strictly constrained by the High Constitutional 
Court (al-al-mahkama dusturiyya al-'ulya)40. Finally, assuming that Egyptian 
constitutional law authorized the president to delegate prerogatives to any organ, the 
decision did not fit the notion of delegation in its common legal sense, which conceives 
it as a power transfer from one authority to another. Indeed, no statement in 
constitutional law did vest the president with the authority he delegated, namely that 
of "administering the country's affairs." 
 
The allocation of power to the military and Mubarak’s departure, not only did lie 
outside the constitutional system, but also were not accompanied by a discourse aimed 
at justifying these "normative creations" in relation to constitutional law. 
 
C - The absence of justification vis-à-vis constitutional law 
 
This absence of compliance and compatibility to constitutional law was not 
counterbalanced by a justification effort to present this decision as "constitutional". 
Mubarak’s decision, as read by his vice-president Omar Suleiman, was laconic and 
contained no motives nor contextualization. As the army, the president did not use  
the notion of "exceptional circumstances", despite the situation of socio-political 
turmoil . One must also note that the president did not resort to the emergency powers 
mentioned in the article 74 of 1971 Constitution41, which could have yet reconnected 
                                                        
36 Article 84 of the 1971 Constitution. 
37 Article 82 of the 1971 Constitution. 
38 The authority to review 1971 Constitution implied the joint participation of the president,  the lower 
chamber and the electoral body  (art. 189). 
39Article 82 of the 1971 Constitution in case of temporary incapacity of the president. Article 139 of the 
1971 Constitution in ordinary circumstances 
40 BERNARD-MAUGIRON, Nathalie, Le politique à l’épreuve du judiciaire : La justice constitutionnelle en 
Égypte, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2004, p. 108. 
41Article 74 of the 1971 Constitution " If any danger threatens the national unity or the safety of the 
motherland or obstructs the constitutional role of the State institutions, the President of the Republic 
shall take urgent measures to confront this danger after consulting the Prime Minister, the Speakers of 
the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council, address a message to the people and conduct a 
referendum on the measures taken within sixty days of their adoption. The People’s Assembly and the 
Shura Council may not be dissolved during the exercise of these powers.’’ 
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his decision to constitutional legality. This “aconstitutional” behavior seemed to 
outline a strategy of return to power. 
 
D - Legitimizing a return to power 
 
What meaning could we attribute to Mubarak’s decision to extract himself from the 
constitutional framework ? The first interpretation is socio-political: Hosni Mubarak 
realized the weakness of his position in the balance of power. He handed over power 
to the military,  which intervened in support of the protesters. The former president 
also complied with the street demand which required his immediate departure from 
power, and whose anger was not only directed towards him but towards the entire 
political system associated with his rule. This opposition rendered likely rejection by 
protesters of the constitutional solutions for presidential replacement namely, as we 
saw above, namely the vice-president Omar Suleiman, and the speaker of the People's 
Assembly, Ahmad Fathi Sorour. The two were associated with Mubarak's 
authoritarian regime. The former was the director of intelligence services. The second 
was member of the president’s party,  the National Democratic Party (al-Hizb al-watani 
al-dimuqrati), and showed great complacency towards the president during while 
chairing the lower house43.  
 
This sociopolitical interpretation may be completed with a legal analysis of the 
decision in relation to the SCAF's Declaration of 11 February. Through this decision, 
the military had expressed their willingness of not to be constrained by the 
constitutional system in their management of the transition period. 
 
Mubarak’s departure can be analyzed as going in the same direction, since he also 
freed himself of the constitutional law associated with 1971 Constitution. In doing so, 
the president could not ignore he was consolidating the legal effects of the breakdonw 
of constitutional order desired by the army, especially as Mubarak was the most 
powerful actor of the constitutional system associated with the text44. Furthermore, by 
vesting the SCAF with the authority of "administering the country's affairs," Mubarak 
was renouncing to the “legal” transition plan that he had presented the previous day, 
in which he had delegated all his powers to vice-president Omar Suleiman45. 
 
This analysis leads to an hypothesis highlighting another legal dimension of 
Mubarak’s decision. Assuming that his political will was to remain or, put differently, 
to "preserve its institutional existence46", then this act might reveal a strategy to return 
to power once the military would have stabilized the revolutionary situation. The fact 
that the 1971 Constitution’s repeal was only implicit in the army’s Declaration would 
not have been unnoticed by Hosni Mubarak. If the military "resurrected" the 
constitution, Mubarak’s return to power could be justified more convincingly, since 
his decision to step down had been taken outside the constitutional framework. From 
                                                        
43See  Kienle, Eberhard, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, London, I.B 
Tauris, 2001, p.. 64-68. 
44On the role of the president of the Republic in the regime associated with 1971 Constitution see EL-
GHAFLOUL, Eid Ahmed, « Pouvoir exécutif et processus législatif en Égypte », Égypte/Monde arabe, 
2005, vol 2, n° 2, pp. 105-132 ; BERNARD-MAUGIRON, Nathalie, "Strong presidentialism: the Model of 
Mubarak's Egypt," in Grote, Rainer and RODER TJ (eds.), Constitutionalism in Islamic countries: 
Between Upheaval and Continuity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012 pp . 373-385. 
45 Al-Yum Al Sabi', February 10, 2011. 
46 TROPER, Michel et CHAMPEIL-DESPLATS, Véronique, Proposition pour une théorie des contraintes 
juridiques, op.cit., p. 15 
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this viewpoint, the use of the term "abandonment" in his act of resignation was 
revealing a hope of (re)investing the office of president. The acknowledgment of the 
sidelining of 1971 Constitution by the deposed president however contributed to the 
opposite as the military confirmed the breakdown of constitutional legality by 
attacking explicitly the normative force of the 1971 Constitution. 
 
III – The explicit suspension of 1971 Constitution by the military: February 13 
“Constitutional” declaration 
 
Two days after its first declaration and Mubarak’s departure, the SCAF, in point 1 of a 
new declaration qualified as constitutional (bayan dusturi), announced that "the 
provisions of the Constitution were suspended" (ta'til al-amal bi-ahkaam al-dustur). Why 
did the military explicitly state the break with 1971 Constitution, while they had not 
done so two days earlier? A response lies in the temporality of the revolutionary 
situation,  by considering this act as an articulation between its past and future. On the 
one hand, the military took note of the reactions to its break with constitutional legality 
as expressed in the  11 February 2011 Declaration. In this sense the Constitutional 
Declaration reflected the success of their intervention (Paragraph 1). On the other 
hand, the Constitutional Declaration contained provisions for a temporary 
organization of public authorities, that the explicitation of the put out of force of 1971 
Constitution was designed to affirm (Paragraph 2). 
 
A – Acknowledging the constitutional outbreak’s success 
 
As seen above, the absence of explicit attack on the normative force of 1971 
Constitution by the Declaration of 11 February 2011  could be analyzed as the 
application of a precautionary principle. The military intended to safeguard the 
possibility of justifying a posteriori the constitutionality of its decision, in case some 
actors would have wanted to sanction it for breaking with constitutional legality. 
 
During the two days which separated both declarations, the army’s intervention raised 
no negative reaction. On the contrary, it was greeted by the participants in the 25 
January Revolution, who rejoiced of Mubarak’s overthrow48, and even recognized by 
the deposed president himself as seen above. Furthermore, other authorities remained 
silent, probably for the judicial bodies as a matter of prudence and for the chambers 
because of their discredit due to their close association with Mubarak’s regime. All 
these reactions could be interpreted by the SCAF as a consent, allowing it to confirm 
the break with constitutional legality and announce the suspension of 1971 
Constitution. 
 
This clarification could also be aimed at strengthening the first organization of public 
authorities of the transitional period, whose content was also outlined in the 
Declaration of 13 February 2011. 
 
B - Affirming the first provisional organization of public authorities 
 
                                                        
48Just after the revolutionary outbreak, the dominant discourse was that the military had sided for the 
people in order to overthrow Mubarak. This association of the military with the “Revolution” was 
epitomized by the diffusion of pictures of protesters falling into the arms of the soldiers the day of the 
announcement of Mubarak’s departure. 
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The suspension of the 1971 Constitution could be understood in the light of the other 
provisions of the "Constitutional Declaration". They outlined a first provisional 
organization of public authorities, in which the SCAF largely prevailed and courts and 
chambers49  were not mentioned. 
 
Thus, from the viewpoint of the military announcing the suspension of the constitution 
signified asserting its power to other bodies likely to contest this new organization of  
public authorities. It meant that the unconstitutionality of the Declaration of February 
13 in relation to the 1971 Constitution would not be recognized as a valid argument. 
Similarly, such an announcement allowed, if necessary, to dispel an argument of the  
coexistence between the constitutional law associated with the 1971 Constitution and 
that of the Constitutional Declaration.  Finally, in case  other organs would still have 
advanced these arguments, they would have been compelled to formulate another one 
aimed at justifying the illegality of 1971 Constitution’s suspension. In other words, the 
SCAF’s decision was designed to prevent the occurrence of a “constitutional 
conflict51"and, in the event such a conflict would happen, to impose additional 
argumentative constraints on potential dissenting bodies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For a lawyer, the interest of revolutionary outbreaks when accompanied with a 
constitutional breakdown depends on the conception of legal science he adopts. If he 
refers to a “normativist” view and considers law strictly as a source of constraint for 
actors, then it is true that there is no much to say. However, the perspective is different, 
if one conceives legal science as a tool to understand the reasoning of actors using legal 
discourse. Legal methodology allows  indeed to offer a reconstruction of actors 
decision-making and to view this discourse as a communication medium particularly 
at destination of other institutional actors. Legal discourse’s function appears to 
reintroduce intelligibility in a period where normal routines are disrupted, and can 
also act as a support for strategic-thinking, as the reconstruction of a universe of 
meaning enables to project oneself into the future.  This has been illustrated here by a 
study of the outcome of the 25 January 2011 Revolution and of the behavior of the 
military and Mubarak. Through their Declaration of 11 February 2011, which broke 
with constitutional legality without attacking directly 1971 Constitution, the military 
asserted their sovereignty while preserving the possibility of resorting later to 
elements of the constitutional system associated with this text. A few hours later by 
resigning outside the constitutional framework, Hosni Mubarak recognized the 
army’s action while making room for a return to power in the event the SCAF would 
restore constitutional legality . This scenario did not materialize as the military 
explicitly suspended 1971 Constitution two days later, through a "Constitutional 
Declaration". This decision was designed to consolidate the first rules that the military 
had laid out in the Declaration to establish their competence to manage temporarily 
the country. This persistence of legal discourse during the "Revolution" reflects the 
persistence of the state, the object of actors competing claims. Indeed, in order to seize 
and control the state, one must speak his language, that of law52.  
                                                        
49 Point 4 of the Constitutional Declaration proclaimed the dissolution of the two Houses of Parliament. 
51Constitutional conflict’s notion refers to a legal conflict  between key constitutional bodies over the 
interpretation of  fundamental norms relating to the organization of government. See BRAMI, Cyril et 
Jacky HUMMEL (dir.), Les conflits constitutionnels : Le droit constitutionnel à l’épreuve de l’histoire et du 
politique, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010.. 
52 WEBER, Max, Economie et société, (t.1), Paris, Pocket, 2003, p. 289. 
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